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THE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS OF THE
POOR IN MAINE: IS MANDATORY
PRO BONO THE ANSWER?
In 1989, the Maine Commission on Legal Needs was formed to
study the civil legal needs of Maine's poor population and to de-
velop a plan for meeting those needs. Similar projects have been un-
dertaken in a number of other states and by the American Bar Asso-
ciation in recent years. Each study has revealed a significant unmet
need among the poor for assistance with legal problems. There
seems little doubt that the situation is serious and widespread. The
difficulty lies in finding a solution. One proposal that has been ad-
vanced is mandatory pro bono, a program that would require attor-
neys to give uncompensated legal assistance to the needy. For years
debate over this proposal has focused on whether such a program
would violate the constitutional rights of attorneys. The debate has
intensified with the recent group of studies highlighting the unmet
legal needs of the poor.
This Comment will review the civil legal needs of Maine's poor
and the currently available resources for meeting those needs. It will
then consider the legal issues involved in requiring counsel to under-
take representation of people unable to afford an attorney in civil
cases. Do courts have the authority to require attorneys to represent
those unable to pay? Although neither the United States Supreme
Court nor the Maine Supreme Judicial Court has addressed the is-
sue, a review of available case law and legal commentaries suggests
that courts very likely do have such authority. This Comment con-
cludes, however, that other approaches should be tried in Maine
before requiring attorneys to take pro bono civil cases.
I THE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY
In 1989, the Maine Bar Foundation1 and the Consortium on the
Study of the Future of the Maine Legal Profession2 established the
1. The Maine Bar Foundation, incorporated in 1983, was established "to facilitate
the administration of justice." Its primary purpose has been and is to asist Maine's
poor in getting access to legal services. The Foundation's mission also includes en-
couraging legal education and scholarship and supporting law libraries. Under the
management of a Board of Directors appointed by the President of the Maine State
Bar Association, the Foundation's principal programs have been the establishment of
the Volunteer Lawyers Project (VLP) and the Interest on Lawyer's Trust Accounts
(IOLTA) program. MArm BAn FoUND. 1989 ANNUAL REPORT.
2. Founded in 1982, the Consortium has nine member organizations: the Board of
Bar Examiners, The Board of Overseers of the Bar, Legal Services for the Elderly,
Inc., the Maine Judicial Council, the Maine State Bar Association, the Maine Trial
Lawyers Association, the Office of the Attorney General, Pine Tree Legal Assistance,
Inc., and the University of Maine School of Law. LEGAL NaEns STUDY-STAT0cin '
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Maine Commission on Legal Needs to oversee a study of the civil
legal needs of Maine's poor population.' Its goal was to inventory
existing resources available to the indigent, survey the needs of the
poor, and develop a plan to meet those needs for the purpose of
providing "access to justice for all Maine citizens.' The Commis-
sion, chaired by former Senator Edmund S. Muskie, began its work
on May 1, 1989, and issued its final report one year later. In the
months following its establishment, the Commission spent consider-
able time and effort gathering information through questionnaires,5
a telephone surveys and public hearings.7
The approach taken by the Maine Commission was similar to the
approach taken by groups in other states that have examined the
civil legal needs of the poor. Recent studies have been completed in
Arizona, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New
York." In addition, the American Bar Association conducted a na-
tionwide survey during 1989.9 Telephone surveys and questionnaires
were the common means for obtaining information, 10 though no
MAINE (Background Paper, 1989).
3. Id.
4. REPORT OF THE MAINE COMMISSION ON LEGAL NEEDS, AN AcTION PLAN FOR Tim
1990's, at 1 (May 1, 1990) [hereinafter COIussIoN REPORT].
5. Questionnaires were sent to those working in the Maine court system (i.e.,
judges and court clerks), to public officials (e.g., members of the Maine Legislature),
to major legal services providers (Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Legal Services for the
Elderly (LSE), VLP, and the Cumberland Legal Aid Clinic), and to specialized prov.
iders (e.g., several family violence shelters, the Maine Civil Liberties Union, and the
Consumer Division of the Attorney General's Office). Id. at A-4.
6. See infra notes 13-20 and accompanying text for an explanation of the survey
and its results.
7. Eight public hearings occurred in October and November 1989 in Machias,
Houlton, Caribou, Rockland, Lewiston, Bangor, Portland, and Augusta. The hearings
provided an opportunity for low income people to speak directly to the Commission.
Private attorneys and representatives of legal services providers also appeared. CoM-
MISSION REPORT, supra note 4 at A-6.
8. See State Bar of Arizona, LEGAL SERVICES COMMITTEE MAjoTrrY REPORT (1989)
[hereinafter AmizONA MAJORrrY REPORT]; ILLINOIS LEGAL NEEDS STUDY (Preliminary
Summary and Findings) (undated but undertaken during 1989); Advisory Council of
The Maryland Legal Services Corp., ACTION PLAN FOR LEGAL SERVICES TO MARY-
LAND'S POOR (1988) [hereinafter MARYLAND ACTION PLAN]; Mass. Legal Assistance
Corp., MASSACHUSETTS LEGAL SERVICES PLAN FOR ACTION (1987); L. Goodman, A PRE-
LIMINARY REPORT ON A STUDY OF THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE POOR IN NEW JERSEY
(1986); Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal Services, PRELIMINARY RE.
PORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (1989) [hereinafter NEW YORK
PRELIMINARY REPORT].
9. See ABA National Civil Legal Needs Survey Final Report (May 1989) [herein-
after ABA FINAL REPORT].
10. One state, New Jersey, utilized in-person interviews with the poor rather than
a telephone survey. Arizona did not conduct a telephone or an in-person survey but
reviewed such surveys from other states and applied the results by analogy. The New
York report drew on results of studies done by other groups within that state. Illinois,
Maryland, Massachusetts, and the ABA all used telephone surveys. See generally,
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study appears to have utilized a public hearing approach in the way
that Maine did."' All of the reports concluded that there was a sig-
nificant unmet need for legal services among those who were poor.'2
The Maine study likewise revealed a need for greater assistance
for poor people experiencing civil legal problems. The telephone sur-
vey in Maine reached 521 low income households and resulted in a
finding of slightly less than one civil legal problem per household
per year.13 More than three-fourths of the problems identified went
without legal help.' 4 The survey included questions covering thirty-
nine different legal problems grouped into eleven categories. 15 Of
these, the four categories most frequently cited by those surveyed
supra note 8.
11. The Maryland and Massachusetts studies included public hearings, but these
occurred in each case after a preliminary report was written. MARLAND AcIoN PLAN,
supra note 8 at 4; MASSACHusEmrs LEGAL SERVICES PLAN FOR ACTION, supra note 8 at
17.
12. For example, the ABA telephone survey of 500 low income people revealed an
average of 1.36 civil legal problems per household per year. Of the 682 problems re-
ported, 80% involved no legal assistance. ABA FINAL REaoar, supra note 9, at 20, 48.
The ABA study then converted its findings to correlate with the 17.569 million house-
holds with incomes at or below 125% of the official poverty level that existed in 1987
and determined that, on a nationwide basis, the indigent had 4.9 million problems for
which legal help was provided but 19 million problems for which no legal help =as
provided. Id. at 48-49. The Illinois telephone survey of 1900 low income homes found
1.69 noncriminal legal problems per household per year for which there was no legal
help. ILLINOIS LEGAL NEns SUnDy, supra note 8, at 8. The Maryland telephone sur-
vey, which reached 800 households, indicated that low income households typically
had 3.29 legal problems per year. Only 37% of the households reported having seen
an attorney within the last five years. MARLAND ACTION PLAN, supra note 8, at 8-10.
The Massachusetts survey of 1082 households found nearly one unmet civil legal
problem per household per year. MsSAcHUsErr LEGAL SRvIcES PLAN FR ACTION,
supra note 8, at 6.
13. The actual number was .95. ComasssION REPORT at 28. The survey was con-
ducted by The Spangenberg Group of West Newton, Mass. This organization had
previously conducted telephone surveys for Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, and
the ABA. Id. at A-4. The Maine telephone survey was aimed at households with in-
comes at or below 125% of the federal poverty level, since this is the criterion used by
Pine Tree Legal Assistance, Inc., the major legal services provider in Maine. The pov-
erty level is established by the United States Office of Management and Budget. In
1989, 125% of this level was $7,475 for one individual and $15,125 for a family of
four. Id. at 3. The first questions asked during the telephone interview were designed
to ensure that the caller had reached a home that would be eligible for free legal
services.
14. CoMPTssION REPORT, supra note 4, at 39. There were 493 problems reported,
of which 111 involved legal assistance. The Spangenberg Group, 1 MAINE LEGAL
NEos STmUY TELEPHONE SuRVEY FINAL REPORT, at 12 (1990) [hereinafter TEuwnoNE
SURvEY FINAL REPORT].
15. The categories were: consumer, utility, housing, employment, education,
health, income maintenance, family, wills and estates, and discrimination. Comm -
SION REPoRr, supra note 4, at 28. In addition, the interviewer asked if there ware any
other noncriminal legal problems encountered by that household during the past
year. Id.
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were income maintenance, health, family, and utility problems. 10
About 65% of all problems reported involved basic necessities."
In addition to obtaining information about the legal needs of the
general population of poor people, the survey was designed to find
out about three particular low income groups-the elderly, house-
holds that included a disabled or mentally ill person, and house-
holds headed by single female parents. Among these three groups,
households headed by single females faced the greatest number of
problems.'8 Another significant survey finding was that two-thirds of
the low income population is unaware of the availability of free legal
services. 19 Perhaps the most surprising survey result was that pri-
vate attorneys who charged for their services handled the majority
of cases that did receive legal help. 20
The information obtained from the telephone survey prompted
the Commission to find that "the poor face civil legal problems
which are significant in number, fundamental in nature, and bur-
densome in effect."'" Moreover, the Commission determined that
the poor are unable to pay for legal help and that the amount of free
legal assistance presently available is "wholly inadequate. 22
It seems clear that even though Maine's survey revealed a slightly
smaller need than the other states' recent surveys, there is a signifi-
cant unmet need in Maine. If the survey results are correlated to the
total estimated population of poor people in Maine,28 the number of
16. Id. at 4.
17. Id. The report defines "basic necessities" as "income maintenance and em-
ployment, health, utility problems, housing, and education." Id.
18. Id. at 30, 32. The survey revealed that households headed by single female
parents experienced an average of 2.1 civil legal problems per year as compared to
approximately one problem per household per year experienced by the general sam-
ple. By contrast, the elderly had a much lower problem rate: 86% of respondents 65
and older said they had experienced no civil legal problems in the past year. House-
holds that included someone with a disability or mental illness were closer to the
general sample. Those households reported 1.3 problems per year. Id.
19. Fifty-one percent of those interviewed stated that there were no free legal ser-
vices; 16% said they did not know if such services were available. Id. at 37.
20. Those surveyed were asked to identify the source of any legal help they re-
ceived. The data indicated that private attorneys handled 58.8% of the problems for
which there was legal assistance. The next largest category was "other," a category
that was not defined; 30.1% of those who received legal help said it fell under this
category. 1 TELEPHONE SURvEy FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 126. The Spangen-
berg Group felt this category should be interpreted with caution, however, and sug-
gested that many of these problems may have been handled by Pine Tree Legal As-
sistance or through the VLP but that those surveyed did not remember the names of
these organizations. Id. at 128. In any event, less than one-quarter of all problems
identified in the survey involved professional legal assistance. Id. at 12.
21. CoMUssloN REPORT, supra note 4, at 4.
22. Id.
23. The Commission estimates that 230,000 people in Maine currently live below
125% of the federal poverty level. This translates to about 85,000 households. Id. at
[Vol. 43:235
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civil problems the poor experience each year approximates 80,750,
for which three-fourths receive no legal assistance.2 '
II. EXISTING RESOURCES
A. Legal Services Providers
Even though there are significant unmet legal needs in Maine, a
number of currently existing programs already address the legal
needs of Maine's poor.2 5
The largest provider, and the one in operation the longest, is Pine
Tree Legal Assistance, Inc.20 With six offices around the state, it
handles a variety of civil cases with an emphasis on housing and
income maintenance matters.17 Funded primarily by the federal gov-
ernment, Pine Tree went through a very difficult period in the
1980's following major funding cutbacks during the Reagan adminis-
tration.28 Not surprisingly, the funding cutbacks resulted in the
need to cut staff. Staffing is still below the 1980 level.2 0 The cut-
24. 1 TELEPHONE SuRvEy FINAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 211. It should be noted,
however, that not all low income households have legal problems. From the survey of
521 homes, 493 problems were reported. These problems were concentrated in 33% of
the households surveyed. Id. at 11-12. In other words, approximately two-thirds of
the households surveyed reported no problems at alL Those households reporting
problems had an average of nearly three per household. Id. at 43. Moreover, there is
no way to determine from the telephone survey the particulars of the problems iden-
tified and how many actually constitute problems that would be appropriate for reso-
lution by the legal system.
25. The unmet needs are not a reflection of the providers' quality of services.
However, two criticisms relating to the providers did surface. One applied particu-
larly to the VLP. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text for an explanation of
this program. The Commission learned that more phone lines were needed since
many people had been unable to reach that office despite repeated efforts to do so.
The other problem was common to all the providers and involved referrals from one
provider to another. The Commission learned that referrals were sometimes made
without any knowledge as to whether the next provider handled the particular type of
problem, resulting in frustration for the poor, who were referred from one provider to
another without getting any real assistance. CoUMwsSIoN RzPon-r, supra note 4, at 64.
26. Created in 1966, Pine Tree's parent organization is the Legal Services Corpo-
ration (LSC) in Washington, D.C., an organization set up by the United States Con-
gress. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1982). ISC closely regulates the work undertaken by
Pine Tree through various statutory provisions and regulations that establish which
types of cases may or may not be handled. For example, Pine Tree is prohibited from
handling cases involving desegregation or abortion. Pine Tree's work involves only
civil cases for individuals whose income is below 125% of the federal poverty level
COsIssSSON REPoRT, supra note 4, at 48.
27. The offices are located in Portland, Lewiston, Augusta, Bangor, Machias, and
Presque Isle. Small specialized offices for migrant farmworkers and Native Americans
are located in the Bangor and Augusta offices respectively. Id.
28. Coms ssION REPORT, supra note 4, at 52. Funding for fiscal year 1982 was
reduced by 25%. During the period from 1980 to 1988 federal funds decreased by
34%, after adjusting for inflation. Id. at 52-53.
29. Pine Tree employed 27 attorneys in 1980 and 23 in 1988. Overall, the total
1991]
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backs necessitated further restrictions in the cases handled by Pine
Tree through a priority-setting process adopted by the organization
statewide and in the individual offices.30 The cutbacks also resulted
in an increase in "brief service" assistance to clients and a decrease
in extended representation and litigation.3 1 In 1988, Pine Tree was
involved in litigation in 995 cases, represented clients without litiga-
tion in another 772 cases, and gave brief service in 9,439 cases.32
In the 1980's, Pine Tree began to spend a percentage of its federal
funds on private bar involvement, that is, on involving private prac-
titioners in representing the poor without compensation.3 Since the
establishment of the Volunteer Lawyers Project (VLP), 4 Pine Tree
has chosen to spend its private bar involvement monies by helping
to fund VLP.35
A second major legal services provider is the organization known
as Legal Services for the Elderly (LSE).36 Established in 1974, LSE
handles civil cases for individuals sixty years of age or older.3 7 It is
difficult to know how many low income people benefit from LSE
since it has no financial eligibility requirements, and its statistics,
therefore, reflect matters handled for people of all income levels.35
However, it is believed that a large majority of LSE's clients have
incomes below 125% of the poverty level.39 For LSE, unlike Pine
Tree, the 1980's were an era of progress in funding, staff levels, and
numbers of cases handled. Funding more than doubled, the number
staff went from 71 in 1980 to 56 in 1988. Id. at 53, n.44.
30. Id. at 48.
31. Id. at 60. Brief service may include formal advice or a referral elsewhere and
generally involves only one contact. Extended representation means a longer, more
extensive attorney-client relationship. Litigation involves representation in judicial or
administrative proceedings. Id. at 58-59 nn.66-68.
32. Id. at 59. These figures are in contrast to those in 1980, when Pine Tree liti-
gated 1,463 cases, represented another 972 clients, and gave brief service in 6,992
cases. Id.
33. Id. at 53. This was mandated by the Legal Services Corporation. Originally
Pine Tree was required to spend 10% of its federal funds for this purpose. The figure
was later increased to 12.5%, the current percentage. Id.
34. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text for an explanation of this
program.
35. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 53. In 1988, Pine Tree contributed more
than $150,000 of VLP's $197,522 budget. VOLUNTEER LAwYERs PROJECT 1988 ANNUAL
REPORT (1989) [hereinafter VLP ANNuAL REPORT].
36. Like Pine Tree, LSE has offices around the state-in Portland, Lewiston, Au-
gusta, Brewer, and Presque Isle-with a number of additional part-time outreach of-
fices. There is also an Advocates for Medicare Patients office in Augusta. COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 4, at 48-49.
37. Id. at 49. LSE handles many cases involving income, individual rights, hous-
ing, and health issues for the elderly. Id.
38. Financial eligibility requirements are prohibited by the Older Americans Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3058d (1982). COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 49.
39. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 49.
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of attorneys went from two to seven, and the total number of cases
increased from 997 to 3,272.40 LSE clearly was a bright spot in the
1980's legal services picture.
A third organization is the Cumberland Legal Aid Clinic. Founded
in 1971, it is associated with the University of Maine School of Law
and provides practical experience for law students, supervised by
faculty, in representing clients in both civil and criminal matters.4 '
The clinic only represents individuals whose incomes are below
125% of the poverty level.42 Thus its focus is on helping Maine's
poor with their legal needs. However, because of its size and location
(handling cases primarily from Cumberland and York Counties), the
clinic is not equipped to handle a large volume of cases from around
the state.4 3
There is a range of other organizations within the state that pro-
vide services to the poor. Several are mentioned in the Commission's
report." The fact that they are not discussed in this Comment is not
an indication of a lack of importance, but is rather a function of the
lack of statistics in the report and an inability to determine how
many low income people receive legal assistance through them.
B. VLP and IOLTA
Two other programs in Maine provide legal assistance to the poor:
the Volunteer Lawyers Project (VLP) and IOLTA (Interest on Law-
yers' Trust Accounts). Both have their origins in the Maine Bar
Foundation."
The Volunteer Lawyers Project, begun in 1983, provides pro bono
legal services to Maine's indigent population by referring eligible in-
dividuals to members of a statewide panel of volunteer attorneys. 0
Located in Portland, VLP utilizes a toll free number so that individ-
uals from around the state may make use of the service. It is princi-
pally a referral service that screens callers to be certain they meet
financial eligibility requirements and then refers them to agencies
that might be of assistance (such as one of the legal services provid-
40. Funding under the Older Americans Act went from approximately $60,000 in
1980 to $133,000 in 1988. Id. at 51. Not only did the number of attorneys increase,
but the total staff rose from six to 17. Id. at 57-58. Of the 3,272 cases handled in 1988,
1,305 involved brief service, 1,611 involved representation without litigation, and the
remaining 356 involved litigation. Id. at 59.
41. Id. at 49.
42. Id.
43. In 1988, the clinic litigated 53 civil cases. During that same period 520 civil
cases received "brief service" from the clinic and another four civil matters involved
representation without litigation. Id. at 59 n.69.
44. See id. at 50-51.
45. See supra note 1.
46. Id. The term "pro bono" is used to indicate that the lawyer's ervices are
offered free of charge.
1991]
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ers) or to private attorneys who have agreed to handle up to three
cases per year on a pro bono basis. 47 VLP has a small staff and relies
on lay volunteers to handle the calls and on "lawyers of the day" to
make the actual referrals.48 At present, approximately 60% of the
Maine Bar has agreed to accept pro bono cases through VLP, a
much higher percentage than the national average of 15%.
4 9
The IOLTA began in 1986 after the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court amended Maine Bar Rule 3.6(f) to permit a voluntary inter-
est-on-lawyers'-trust-accounts program.50 Under the program, a law-
yer or law firm may establish "a pooled, insured, interest-bearing
account for the deposit of all client funds that are not reasonably
and in good faith expected to bear net interest. . ." and "[t]he law-
yer or law firm shall direct the depository institution to remit any
net interest that may accrue on this account to the Maine Bar Foun-
dation . . . ."51 In other words, client funds that would be held for
too short a time period to earn interest for the client may be placed
in a pooled account with other similarly situated client funds, the
interest on which is then paid to the Maine Bar Foundation. In
1989, over $665,000 was raised through the IOLTA program with
47. VLP ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 35. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 49.
VLP uses the same financial eligibility standards as does Pine Tree Legal Assistance.
In addition to referring callers to other agencies and to private attorneys for pro bono
representation, VLP provides brief service and sends material to others who call but
are not referred. In 1988, 7,120 calls to VLP resulted in 1,198 referrals to private
attorneys for representation and 1,027 referrals to Pine Tree and other agencies. An-
other 890 callers were told about the Maine Lawyer Referral Service, a service of the
state bar association that makes referrals to participating private attorneys who
charge fees for their services. Brief service or materials were given to another 2,239
individuals who called VLP. The remainder were ineligible under the financial crite-
ria or were unable to be referred by VLP. VLP ANNuAL REPORT. It should be noted
that the Commission Report provides different caseload statistics for VLP in 1988.
Total calls are shown to be 5,285, with 360 of these resulting in litigation, 538 in
representation without litigation, and 4,387 in brief service. CoMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 4, at 59.
48. A "lawyer of the day" is an attorney, usually from Cumberland County, who
volunteers time to review cases received by VLP and refers them to a private attor-
ney on VLP's statewide panel for pro bono representation. When this program
started, it was the first of its kind in the country. VLP ANNUAL REPORT.
49. MAInE BAR FoUND. 1989 ANNUAL REPORT. This translates to a panel of approx-
imately 1,500 lawyers. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 5.
50. Amendments to Maine Bar Rules, Me. Rptr., 498-509 A.2d XCVI-XCVII
(1986).
51. M. Bar R. 3.6(0(5). The explanation accompanying the 1986 amendment of
the rule states that the program was "intended to provide funds for the support of
legal services to the poor of Maine." Me. Rptr., 498-509 A.2d C (1986). When the
program was first established, a law firm could designate any nonprofit corporation to
receive the funds. Id. at XCVI. With the further amendment of M. Bar R. 3.6(f) in
1989, the Maine Bar Foundation became the sole designee for IOLTA revenues. Me.
Rptr., 551-562 A.2d CLXI (1989).
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more than 70% of Maine's attorneys participating."2 IOLTA grants
have been awarded by the Maine Bar Foundation to a number of
groups, with the largest amounts going to Pine Tree Legal Assis-
tance, the Volunteer Lawyers Project, Legal Services for the Elderly,
the State Court Library Committee (to upgrade county law librar-
ies), and the Cumberland Legal Aid Clinic.53
C. Statutes
The Maine Legislature has also passed laws designed to help those
in financial need resolve their problems without the necessity of
resorting to the court system. Examples of such laws include the
statute relating to termination of utility services" and the statutes
involving enforcement of child support obligations.15 These laws es-
tablish procedures by which those threatened with the shut-off of a
vital service and those unable to collect money owed for support can
resolve their problems without going to court. The underlying as-
sumption appears to be that these individuals are among those least
able to afford an attorney and that at least some problems lend
themselves to solutions without the necessity of court supervision."
52. %mina BAR FoUND. 1989 A_,uAL RPoRT. Maine has the highest participation
rate of any voluntary program in the country.
53. Id. The Bar Foundation distributes IOLTA funds by means of automatic
grants and discretionary grants. Pine Tree, LSE, and the Clinic are recipients of au-
tomatic grants each year. Support for VLP is a line item in the Bar Foundation's
budget. COMMSSION REPoRT, supra note 4 at 54.
54. A. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 704 (1988 & Supp. 1989) provides that a util-
ity must give a residential customer written notice prior to termination of service for
nonpayment of a bill It also gives the customer a right to enter into reasonable in-
stallment payment arrangements prior to termination. Any dispute concerning the
proposed termination is to be settled at an informal hearing between the customer
and the utility, with the customer given a right of appeal to the Public Utilities
Commission.
55. Ma. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit 19, § 448-A (Supp. 1989) empowers the Department
of Human Services (DHS) to locate absent parents, defend against support obliga-
tions, seek motions to increase such obligations, and to enforce obligations. Although
the statute provides that DHS be paid a fee for such services, the department may
defer or waive the fee. Other sections give DHS broad enforcement powera. See, e.g.,
title 19, § 503 which permits the department to file a lien against property of the
responsible parent and title 19, § 504-A which authorizes the commissioner to direct a
person to withhold a parent's wages.
56. The effectiveness of the statute relating to termination of utility services is
questionable in view of the fact that utility problems were one of the four problems
most frequently identified by the telephone survey. It is quite possible, however, that
many low income people are unaware of or do not understand their statutory rights.
Moreover, there is a difference between not needing to go to court and not needing
legal guidance. Therefore, even though statutory procedures provide an alternative to
the court system, there may still be a need for an attorney's assistance.
1991]
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IH. ADDRESSING THE UNMET NEEDS
Despite all of the services and programs presently in place in
Maine, there is still a large gap between the services available to the
poor and the legal needs of that group. The Maine Legal Needs
Commission determined that more than 200 additional legal services
lawyers are needed to meet the current need.87 Since it is highly un-
likely that public funds (or private contributions) will be available
to pay the salaries of so many attorneys, it is apparent that other
solutions must be considered if we are to provide legal access for all
Maine citizens.
A proposal that has been receiving increased attention around the
country is one that would require all attorneys to devote a certain
amount of time each year to assisting indigent citizens with their
legal needs without charge, the so-called mandatory pro bono ap-
proach. 8 Can such a requirement be imposed? The proposal has
generated much debate with the arguments often focusing on an at-
torney's constitutional rights. For example, would mandatory pro
bono amount to involuntary servitude, deprive an attorney of equal
protection of the laws, or result in a taking of private property for
public use without just compensation?
Before examining the legality of a profession-wide pro bono re-
quirement, this Comment will review cases in which courts have had
to decide whether they had inherent authority to require an attor-
ney to represent an individual without pay.59 In one sense the con-
cept of mandatory pro bono for all attorneys is but a larger applica-
tion of the question whether a court has such authority over
individual attorneys.
A. No Constitutional Right to Counsel in Civil Cases
As an initial matter, it is well-settled that those individuals unable
to afford an attorney have a constitutional right to representation
when defending themselves against criminal charges resulting in im-
57. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 5. The Commission estimated there are
61,000 civil legal problems of the poor in Maine that go without legal assistance each
year. It then assumed that half of these problems would require extended representa-
tion or litigation. In order to meet the need, not only would the legal services provid-
ers require 232 additional lawyers, but all 2,700 private attorneys would need to take
three pro bono cases per year, and the Law School Clinic would need to double its
workload. Id. Moreover, assuming the other half of the 61,000 problems could be han-
dled by brief service, an additional 30 paralegals would need to be hired by the legal
services providers to meet that need. Id. at 6.
58. The Maine Commission did not focus its attention on mandatory pro bono
but did recommend that the matter be studied. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4 at
6.
59. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court is not one of the courts that has been
faced with this issue.
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prisonment.60 This right is grounded in the sixth amendment of the
United States Constitution and has been made applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. 1
The United States Supreme Court, however, has recognized no
such absolute right to counsel in civil cases. In Lassiter v. Depart-
ment of Social Services,62 the Court indicated that a right to ap-
pointed counsel could exist under the due process clause.05 The
Court made it clear, however, that such a right must be determined
on a case-by-case basis and set forth guidelines for doing so. First,
the Court said a presumption exists that there is no right to ap-
pointed counsel unless losing the case could deprive the indigent
party of physical liberty.' The other guidelines stem from the
'Court's decision in Mathews v. Eldridge0 and include consideration
of the private interest at stake, the government's interest, and the
risk that there will be an erroneous decision resulting from the pro-
cedures used.66 The three Mathews guidelines must be balanced
against each other and then weighed against the presumption.
7
In a recent Maine case the Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the
Law Court, applied the Lassiter criteria and determined that there
was no constitutional right to appointed counsel in an action to es-
tablish paternity.6 8 It follows from these cases that very few low in-
come people in Maine will be entitled to court-appointed counsel as
a matter of constitutional right in civil matters.00
60. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S.
25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
61. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335.
62. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
63. Id. at 25.
64. Id. at 26-27. The issue in the underlying case was whether the petitioner's
parental rights should be terminated.
65. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
66. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. at 27.
67. Id. In Lassiter, the Court held that the trial judge did not err when he failed
to appoint counsel the petitioner. Id. at 33.
68. Department of Human Serve. v. Tarvers, 561 A.2d 1029, 1030 (Me. 1989). The
court applied the Mathews balancing test in upholding the superior court's denial of
appointed counsel to the individual who was the claimed father.
69. Even if the Law Court were to decide that some civil proceedings warranted
court-appointed counsel on constitutional grounds, the court would face an additional
issue relating to compensation. Would such attorneys be compensated? If so, does the
court have authority to authorize payment to such court-appointed attorneys, or
would any payment need to be authorized by the Legislature? If attorneys were ex-
pected to take such cases on a nonpaying basis, the eame constitutional objections
(claims of involuntary servitude or a taking of property without just compensation)
could be raised as are made in connection with the mandatory pro bono proposal See
discussion infra in part I(D). Of course, the Legislature could resolve the issue by
providing for payment to court-appointed attorneys in any civil case where the court
had ruled a party was constitutionally entitled to representation. The Legislature has,
for example, authorized payment to court-appointed counsel in child protection pro-
ceedings. Ma. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4005 (Supp. 1989).
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B. In Forma Pauperis Statutes
Apart from the issue of a constitutional right to counsel, some
states provide statutory authority for indigents to proceed in forma
pauperis and permit courts to appoint counsel in such cases.10 Con-
gress has also adopted an in forma pauperis statute for use in fed-
eral courts.7 1 Recently, in Mallard v. United States District Court
for the Southern District of Iowa," the United States Supreme
Court interpreted this statute to mean that there is no court author-
ity to require an unwilling attorney to represent an indigent civil
litigant."' Even in states that have statutes authorizing the assign-
ment of counsel, courts have not found an absolute right to counsel
once an indigent party requests an attorney, but rather have deter-
mined that such assignment is discretionary with the court.74 Other
states, including Maine, have no statutes addressing the in forma
pauperis rights of civil litigants.7
C. Inherent Authority and Officers of the Court
The answer to the problem of inadequate legal assistance for the
70. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 110, § 5-105 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 514.040 (Vernon 1949); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 1102(a) (McKinney 1976).
Such statutes typically authorize individuals found indigent by a court to proceed
without liability for court fees or costs. They also allow the court in its discretion to
appoint counsel. Some statutes explicitly provide that the attorney will serve without
compensation (Illinois and Missouri); others are silent on the issue (New York).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1982) provides in part:
(a) Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement,
prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or
appeal therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor,
by a person who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs or give
security therefor.
(d) The court may request an attorney to represent any such person una-
ble to employ counsel ....
72. 490 U.S. 296 (1989).
73. The Court split 5-4 in reaching its decision. The majority held that the word
"request" in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982) is precatory and an attorney may not be
penalized for failing to agree to a court's request. Mallard v. United States Dist.
Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296. The dissent took the position that unless
"request" were construed to mean "respectfully command," the statute was essen-
tially meaningless. Id. at 317 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It should be noted that oven
the majority made it clear that all it was doing was interpreting the statute. The
Court specifically declined to address the question whether federal courts possess in-
herent authority to require lawyers to accept appointment since that had not been
the basis for the court's decision below. Id. at 310.
74. See, e.g., In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53 (1975). In that case the
court declined to mandate the assignment of counsel in all matrimonial cases involv-
ing indigents. Id. at 440, 330 N.E.2d at 57.
75. Maine does have a civil rule addressing in forma pauperis proceedings. While
the rule provides for the waiver of fees and costs, it says nothing about the appoint-
ment of an attorney. MR. Civ. P. 91.
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poor does not necessarily lie in making the federal statute more
stringent or in working for passage of in forma pauperis statutes in
all of the states. The more fundamental issue is whether courts have
inherent authority to appoint (unwilling) counsel to represent an in-
digent party in a civil case. If they do, then in forna pauperis stat-
utes serve merely to confirm what a court may do on its own
authority.7
6
In the criminal context the sixth amendment right to counsel has
provided a sufficient basis for courts to exercise their authority to
appoint attorneys to represent indigent defendants and to override
any objections made by attorneys that their constitutional rights are
violated by such appointments.7 7 In a civil matter where no absolute
right to counsel exists, the inherent authority of the court to appoint
counsel is not as clear. The extent of inherent judicial power is an
important issue, and must be discussed not only in the context of
the needs of indigents but also in terms of the claimed constitu-
tional rights of lawyers. It is necessary, then, to examine the concept
of the inherent authority of the court, to consider its derivation, and
to see how it has been applied, particularly in Maine.
The concept of inherent authority is most often discussed by the
Maine Supreme Judicial Court in terms of regulating the practice of
law. In In re Feingold,7 8 the court spoke of "the authority and power
inherent in the court" in the context of an attorney's appeal from a
decision not to admit him to the bar.7 0 The court took the opportu-
nity to discuss statutory provisions respecting admission and disbar-
ment as they relate to the court's inherent authority in this area.
Statutory provisions purporting to confer authority upon the Su-
preme Judicial Court respecting the admission or reinstatement of
attorneys to, and suspension or disbarment from, the practice of
law are not exclusive. Such provisions are in aid of the authority
and power inherent in the court... [I]n this area, the judicial
branch of the government, acting through the courts, has exclusive
jurisdiction and the legislative branch, acting through the Legisla-
ture, can in no way limit this inherent power and authority of the
76. This is the position of the New York Court of Appeals. In re Smiley, 36
N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53 (1975). It appears that an in forma pauperis statute is
necessary only if a state's highest court decides there is no inherent authority to order
counsel to represent indigents in a civil matter. A court could not, however, order
counsel to undertake such representation on its own authority or pursuant to statute
if any of the constitutional attacks on mandatory pro bono are sustained. These are
discussed infra in part 11(D).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 978 (1966); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966). Of course, there
are now statutes and court rules that codify the authority of the court to appoint
counsel for an indigent in a criminal matter. In Maine, M& Rv. STAT. AN. tit. 15, §
810 (1980) and M.R. Camm P. 44 address this topic.
78. 296 A.2d 492 (Me. 1972).
79. Id. at 495-96.
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court.80
In essence, the court stated its inherent power derives from the fact
that it has sole authority to govern the judicial branch of the gov-
ernment. In other words, the derivation of its inherent authority lies
in the separation of powers contained in the Maine Constitution. 1
The court restated its position more explicitly in a later case, Board
of Overseers of the Bar v. Lee."2 There the court quoted pertinent
sections of the Maine Constitution and then said:
It is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that each de-
partment in our tri-partite scheme has, without any express grant,
the inherent right to accomplish all objects necessarily within the
orbit of that departifient when not expressly allocated to, or lim-
ited by the existence of a similar power in, one of the other depart-
ments. The inherent power of the Supreme Judicial Court, there-
fore, arises from the very fact that it is a court and connotes that
which is essential to its existence and functioning as a court. ...
... The power to define and regulate the practice of law natu-
rally and logically belongs to the judicial department. The admis-
sion and disbarment of attorneys is the ultimate exercise of that
power and is a judicial act."
Later Maine cases confirm this inherent power of the court to reg-
ulate the conduct of attorneys. These cases utilize additional lan-
guage from Lee that identified attorneys as "officers of the court."8'
Thus trial courts have power to impose discovery sanctions on attor-
neys as officers of the court as "an inherent part of the court's au-
80. Id. at 496.
81. The Maine Constitution provides:
Section 1. The powers of this government shall be divided into three dis-
tinct departments, the legislative, executive and judicial.
Section 2. No person or persons, belonging to one of these departments,
shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others,
except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.
M. CONsT. art. II, §§ 1, 2.
82. 422 A.2d 998 (Me. 1980). In Lee an attorney challenged the Maine bar rule
that required him to pay an annual registration fee if he wished to actively practice
law. Upon his failure to pay the fee, Lee was suspended from the practice of law in
accordance with the rule. The court upheld the rule against various constitutional
attacks.
83. Id. at 1002. The court noted in its opinion that there are other applications of
the doctrine of inherent judicial power, and cited cases from other jurisdictions where
courts have compelled allocation of public funds to the judicial department and
where courts have exercised their power to administer fuhds free from legislative or
executive interference. Id. at 1003 n.11.
84. Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Campbell, 539 A.2d 208, 209 (Me. 1988);
State v. Grant, 487 A.2d 627, 629-30 (Me. 1985); Battryn v. Indian Oil Co., 472 A.2d
937, 942 (Me. 1984). The court first used the term "officer of the court" in describing
an attorney in an 1875 disbarment case, Sanborn v. Kimball, 64 Me. 140, 143 (1875)
("An attorney at law is an officer of the court as appears from the terms of his oath of
office . . .").
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thority to regulate the conduct of proceedings before it.' ' 5 Similarly,
trial courts have inherent authority to inquire into an attorney's
conduct and take appropriate action to protect the integrity of the
judicial system.88 Moreover, the Maine Bar Rules, promulgated by
the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, refer to an attorney as an officer
of the court and state that "[a]ny attorney admitted to, or engaging
in, the practice of law in this State shall be subject to the Court's
supervision and disciplinary jurisdiction .... ."87
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court has not addressed the con-
cepts of attorneys as officers of the court and inherent authority of
the court in the context of assigning counsel to an indigent litigant.
These terms have appeared, however, in decisions made in other ju-
risdictions where the issue has been presented. The decisions are not
uniform in result, though the majority of courts considering the is-
sue appear to agree that the judiciary does have the power to ap-
point counsel in a civil case.88 These cases also serve as a spring-
board for considering the constitutional issues most often raised by
those objecting to the uncompensated assignment of counsel.
Some cases discuss the court's authority to appoint attorneys in
the context of a criminal setting, although the relevant language is
broad enough to encompass civil matters. A frequently cited United
States Supreme Court decision, Powell v. Alabama,0 stated that-
"Attorneys are officers of the court, and are bound to render service
when required by such an appointment."0 0 A more recent decision
85. Battryn v. Indian Oil Co., 472 A.2d at 942.
86. State v. Grant, 487 A.2d at 629.
87. M. Bar R. 1(a).
88. Commentators disagree in their analysis of the various case One commenta-
tor has stated.
Although the courts have usually been reluctant to grant litigants a right
to counsel in civil litigations, they have repeatedly reaffirmed their own
power to appoint counsel in civil cases where, in the exercise of judicial
discretion, such assignment is deemed warranted... Such a professional
obligation of each lawyer to accept appointment without compensation is
widely recognized in almost every state, and has been codified by statute in
more than half the states and in the federal system.
Rosenfeld, Mandatory Pro Bono: Historical and Constitutional Perspectives, 2 CAR-
DOZO L Rv. 255, 275-76 (1981) (footnotes omitted). On the other hand, a different
commentator who surveyed the various decisions made this observation:
Since lawyers first began to raise the question whether they could be re-
quired to represent civil or criminal litigants for little or no pay, the re-
sponse of the courts has been varied and, in many instances, tentative and
troubled. Yet it has often been asserted that a "vast majority" of courts
hold that a lawyer may be compelled to serve.
Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L Rrv. 735, 753-54
(1980). Shapiro did find, however, that in a majority of the jurisdictions with relevant
precedents, there was an enforceable duty to represent an indigent. Id. at 756.
89. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
90. Id. at 73. In this case involving a capital criminal offense, the defendants had
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by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, United States v. Dillon,91
echoed the statement made in Powell and further said:
An applicant for admission to practice law may justly be deemed to
be aware of the traditions of the profession which he is joining, and
to know that one of these traditions is that a lawyer is an officer of
the court obligated to represent indigents for little or no compensa-
tion upon court order.2
It is perhaps noteworthy that the Ninth Circuit's opinion was later
cited with approval by the United States Supreme Court.98 More-
over, in its recent decision regarding the federal in forma pauperis
statute e4 the dissent quoted the above language from Dillon.0
State courts have also considered the issue of their authority to
assign counsel in the context of both civil and criminal cases. In Ala-
bama, the supreme court upheld the constitutionality of an indigent
defense system established by a circuit judge and, in language al-
most identical to Dillon, said:
An applicant for admission to practice law may rightfully be
deemed to be cognizant of the traditions of the profession which he
is joining, and to know that one of these traditions is that a lawyer
is an officer of the court obligated to represent indigents for little
or no compensation upon court order."0
New Jersey likewise upheld the constitutionality of its assignment
system, though for policy reasons the court declined to require the
been unable to employ counsel. The Court said it was the trial court's duty to assign
counsel for them and then made the statement that attorneys as officers of the court
are bound to accept such appointment. It is noteworthy that this decision occurred 30
years before the Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the
landmark case announcing the right to counsel in criminal cases in state court
grounded in the sixth and fourteenth amendments. There is no discussion in Powell
as to the meaning of the term "officers of the court."
91. 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
92. Id. at 635. This case also involved a criminal matter. Here the defendant
sought counsel in a proceeding to vacate his conviction and set aside his sentence. At
the conclusion of the proceedings, the attorney assigned to the matter sought com-
pensation, raising a constitutional issue. The attorney claimed that requiring him to
serve without compensation was a taking of private property for public use without
just compensation in violation of the fifth amendment. It was in this context that the
court ruled against him and made its statement about his obligation as an officer of
the court.
93. See Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 589 (1973) (one dollar statutory
per diem for incarcerated witnesses prior to trial does not constitute a "taking" of
property under the fifth amendment since that amendment does not require payment
by the government for performance of a public duty it is already owed).
94. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296,
(1989). See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
95. Id. at 317 n.7.
96. Sparks v. Parker, 368 So. 2d 528, 532 (Ala. 1979). The constitutional attack
was grounded in the fifth amendment's prohibition against the taking of private
property for public use without just compensation.
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bar to take on assignments without compensation."
New York, Louisiana, and California have considered the matter
of assigned counsel in civil cases." The courts in all three states
have made clear there was inherent authority to assign attorneys,
although the California court's ruling was more limited and had con-
stitutional underpinnings.9 9 The Louisiana court went so far as to
say that its inherent authority to appoint counsel also included the
power to require the state or its subdivision to provide for payment
of counsel fees where reasonably necessary. °1 0 Neither the New York
97. State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966). The system had been chal-
lenged on the basis of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution. The court said "what we have meets the constitutional demand, and
... we are satisfied that our assignment system does not fall short because assigned
counsel are unpaid." Id. at 407, 217 A.2d at 445. Nevertheless, the court refused to
hold attorneys to the obligation of representing indigents in criminal cases without
pay because of the unfair burden that would be placed on them in view of the num-
ber and complexity of such cases; the court then called on the legislature to provide
funding to compensate those handling indigent criminal cases. Id. at 414-15, 217 A.2d
448-49.
98. In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 330 N.E.2d 53 (1975); State ex rel. Johnson, 475
So. 2d 340 (La. 1985); Yarbrough v. Superior Court of Napa County, 39 Cal. 3d 197,
216 Cal. Rptr. 425, 702 P.2d 583 (1985).
99. In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d at 438, 330 N.E.2d at 55-56; State ex reL Johnson, 475
So. 2d at 342; Yarbrough v. Superior Court of Napa County, 39 Cal. 3d at 200, 216
Cal Rptr. at 427, 702 P.2d at 585. As discussed earlier, New York has an in forma
pauperis statute authorizing assignment of counsel in a civil case. See supra note 70
and accompanying text. The court, however, did not rely on the statute in reaching
its decision. Rather, it relied on the inherent authority of New York courts-
Inherent in the courts and historically associated with the duty of the Bar
to provide uncompensated services for the indigent has been the discretion-
ary power of the courts to assign counsel in a proper case to represent pri-
vate indigent litigants. Such counsel serve without compensation. Statutes
codify the inherent power of the courts.
In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d at 438, 330 N.E.2d at 55 (citations omitted).
In Johnson, a child abandonment proceeding, the Louisiana court stated that its
inherent authority derived from the separation of powers established in that state's
constitution and then specifically announced. "[A] court has the inherent power to
require an attorney to represent an indigent, with or without compensation, as an
obligation burdening his privileges to practice and to serve as an officer of court."
State ex rel. Johnson, 475 So. 2d at 342.
In Yarbrough, the California Supreme Court reairmed an earlier decision, Payne
v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405, 553 P.2d 565 (1976), in which
the court determined that a trial court had authority to appoint counsel for an indi-
gent prisoner made a defendant in a civil action. Yarbrough v. Superior Court of
Napa County, 39 Cal. 3d at 200, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 427, 702 P.2d at 585. This right
arose out of the indigent's due process and equal protection rights under the federal
and California Constitutions entitling the prisoner to have access to the courts. Id.
The court said that appointment of counsel was "a last alternative" and stres-sed that
access to the courts, not a right to counsel, was the key point. Id. at 200-201, 216 Cal.
Rptr. at 427, 702 P.2d at 585.
100. State ex rel. Johnson, 475 So. 2d at 342.
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court nor the California court took this position.10 1 On the other
hand, the Missouri Supreme Court has made it clear that courts in
that state do not have inherent authority to appoint unwilling coun-
sel in civil cases without compensation. 102
One of the interesting points of comparison among most of the
above court decisions is the lack of discussion concerning the mean-
ing of "inherent power of the court" or "officer of the court." 03 The
phrases are used as a means of supporting the result in a given case,
but there is very little explanation of their derivation, of what they
mean or of how they relate to requiring attorneys to represent indi-
gents. A recent article takes the position that the origin and mean-
ing of "officer of the court" are "elusive" and that the term is often
used by courts and commentators to "refer generically and conve-
niently" to various ethical responsibilities of attorneys.' 0' Nor does
101. The New York court stated that under the state constitution it could not
"arrogate the power to appropriate and provide funds." In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d at
438, 330 N.E.2d at 56. The California court said that the power to appoint was inde-
pendent of the power to compensate and left the question whether it had power to
compensate to another day. Yarbrough v. Superior Court of Napa County, 39 Cal. 3d
at 201, 207, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 427, 431, 702 P.2d at 585, 589.
102. State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1985). Missouri has an in
forma pauperis statute, but the court determined the plaintiff was not eligible for
relief under that statute. The Missouri court's decision has been criticized both in its
approach to the in forma pauperis statute and in its statements about the inherent
authority of the courts. Fisch, Coercive Appointments of Counsel in Civil Cases In
Forma Pauperis: An Easy Case Makes Hard Law, 50 Mo. L. Rev. 527 (1985). The
article traces the court's earlier cases regarding its inherent authority, including such
authority as it relates to appointment of counsel in criminal cases, and concludes the
Scott case is out of line with the court's earlier pronouncements. Id. at 531.
103. There are two exceptions. One is United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633
(1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966), which included an appendix (originally a
portion of the government's brief) detailing the history of court appointments to re-
present indigents. The emphasis, however, was on tradition and not on any explana-
tion of the term "officer of the court." Id. at 636-38. The other is State ex rel. John-
son, 475 So. 2d 340 (La. 1985), in which the court indicated its inherent authority
derived from the separation of powers contained in the Louisiana Constitution and
then said:
Among the purposes for which inherent judicial power may be exerted are
the issuance of needful orders in aid of a court's jurisdiction and the regula-
tion of the practice of law. In aid of these purposes, a court has the inherent
power to require an attorney to represent an indigent, with or without com-
pensation, as an obligation burdening his privileges to practice and to serve
as an officer of court.
Id. at 341-42 (citations omitted). There is, however, no explanation of "officer of
court."
104. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAN. L. REv. 39, 42 (1989). The
author's thesis is that lawyers have two roles-as zealous advocates and as officers of
the court. Lawyers like to refer to themselves as officers of the court, but in fact the
term has very little meaning although it creates a good public image for the profes-
sion. The author reviews the existing duties of an attorney as an officer of the court
and proposes modifications of the rules of professional responsibility to bring the ob-
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the Maine court's characterization of the lawyer as an officer of the
court 05 offer a complete explanation of the term or provide much
insight into what duties the attorney owes the court as one of its
officers. The Maine court's analysis of its inherent authority, how-
ever, is more extensive than the analysis found in the decisions from
other jurisdictions reviewed in this Comment.
More thought needs to be given to the meaning of the term "of-
ficer of the court" and its connection to a court's inherent authority
if these are to be used as justifications for requiring attorneys to
accept court appointments. One commentator has suggested that
the term "connote[s] a mandatory public interest role for law-
yers."106 In other words, in serving as an officer of the court, an at-
torney owes duties to the judicial system and the public and not just
to individual clients. The New Jersey Supreme Court expressed a
similar idea when it said:
The duty to defend the indigent without charge is not a personal
duty in the conventional sense of an obligation owed by one man to
another .... Rather the duty is owed to the Court, and it is the
Court's call that he is obliged to answer. The duty is to assist the
Court in the business before it.107
To carry the point one step further, the duty to represent the indi-
gent as an officer of the court is one that an attorney acquires upon
licensure to practice. This might well provide a basis for requiring
attorneys to assist the public and the courts by representing indi-
gents in civil matters and thereby furthering access to justice for all,
since courts have made it clear that the power to regulate the prac-
tice of law belongs to the judicial department."0 '
ligations into line with what the author feels the term "officer of the court" should
include. One of the recommendations is that attorneys be required to do pro bono
work. Id. at 40-48, 84. For additional information on the history of the term and its
use by the courts, see Martineau, The Attorney as an Officer of the Court Time to
Take the Gown Off the Bar, 35 S.C.L REv. 541 (1984). The author states that the
term is "used almost as an incantation with little or no analysis of what the title
means or why a particular result should flow from it." Id. at 541.
105. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
106. Gaetke, supra note 104, at 48. Gaetke goes on to say that "[t]he primary
distinguishing characteristic of the duties making up the officer of the court obliga-
tion... must be their subordination of the interests of the client and the lawyer to
those of the judicial system and the public." Id.
107. State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 410, 217 A.2d 441, 447 (1966).
108. Indeed, the New Jersey and Louisiana courts have said as much in the con-
text of requiring attorneys to represent indigents. State v. Rush, 46 N.J. at 410, 217
A.2d at 447; State ex rel. Johnson, 475 So.2d 340, 341-42 (La. 1985). The Maine court
likewise has stated that the power to regulate the practice of law inheres in the judici-
ary. Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Lee, 422 A.2d 998, 1002 (Me. 1980). See supra
note 83 and accompanying text.
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D. Claimed Constitutional Violations
Even if the concepts "inherent authority" and "officer of the
court" were clarified, a mandatory pro bono requirement for attor-
neys could not be imposed if there were constitutional impediments
to such a requirement, for a court does not have inherent authority
to order, nor can an officer of the court be required to undertake, an
assignment that violates constitutional rights. Nor could an in forma
pauperis statute impose such a burden. A number of claimed consti-
tutional violations related to mandatory pro bono, on an individual
or profession-wide basis, have been raised over the years. These are
based primarily on the fifth, thirteenth, and fourteenth amendments
to the United States Constitution.'0 9 Although commentators and a
few courts have addressed the constitutional claims, the United
States Supreme Court has yet to reach them.110
One argument is that mandatory pro bono would violate the thir-
teenth amendment's prohibition of involuntary servitude.111 Accord-
ing to this argument, forcing attorneys to accept an uncompensated
assignment against their will amounts to involuntary servitude. One
federal court has agreed, and refused to coerce an attorney into rep-
resenting a complainant-in a civil case. 1 2 No other court has taken
such a position, and commentators are in general agreement that the
thirteenth amendment is not a likely basis upon which to defeat
mandatory pro bono. 12' The better reasoning appears to be that the
application of the thirteenth amendment to mandatory pro bono
would be excluded under the line of cases giving the state power to
requisition services to meet a public need.11 4
The fourteenth amendment's guarantee of equal protection is also
109. Other arguments, advanced less frequently, claim a due process violation or a
violation of an attorney's freedom of association. See, e.g., Comment, Mandatory Pro
Bono: The Path to Equal Justice, 16 PEPPERniNE L. RaV. 355, 368-69 (1989) [herein-
after Comment, Mandatory Pro Bono].
110. In its recent decision on the federal in forma pauperis statute, the Court
specifically left open this question. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for the S.
Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989) ("Nor do we express an opinion on the question
whether the federal courts possess inherent authority to require lawyers to serve.").
111. This amendment provides in pertinent part: "Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude... shall exist, within the United States . U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, §
1.
112. In re Nine Applications for Appointment of Counsel in Title VII Proceed-
ings, 475 F.Supp. 87 (N.D. Ala. 1979). The court said: "It is a fundamental concept
that compulsory rendition of service creates an involuntary servitude .... Plainly
the attorney who is coerced into representing a Title VII complainant is placed into
involuntary servitude, in violation of the thirteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution." Id. at 88.
113. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, supra note 88, at 290-94; Shapiro, supra note 88, at 767-
70; Comment, Mandatory Pro Bono, supra note 109, at 368.
114. Shapiro, supra note 88, at 769. For example, military conscription has been
upheld against a thirteenth amendment challenge. The Selective Draft Law Cases,
245 U.S. 366 (1917). See also Rosenfeld, supra note 88, at 290-94.
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advanced as a reason why pro bono service may not be mandated.1 5
Here the argument runs that a lawyer may not be singled out from
other citizens or other professionals and required to give services
free of charge without violating the lawyer's equal protection rights.
No cases have upheld a claim based on this alleged constitutional
defect, and it has been pointed out by commentators that courts
have upheld obligations of and restrictions on professionals as a con-
dition of licensing.1" In order to survive an equal protection chal-
lenge, a professional regulation must be rationally related to a legiti-
mate public purpose.117 There is a readily apparent relationship
between mandatory pro bono and the valid public purpose of pro-
viding access to the judicial process for all.
Perhaps the strongest constitutional challenge derives from the
fifth amendment and centers around the taking of property without
just compensation.11 8 The theory is that to require attorneys to pro-
vide services without receiving any payment in return equals a tak-
ing of their private property for public use without just compensa-
tion. This contention has been rejected by some courts.110
Commentators also reject it, although at least one sees it as a very
close call. 20 There are two major arguments marshaled against the
115. This amendment provides in pertinent part: "[Nior shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." US. CoNST. amend.
XIV, § 1.
116. Rosenfeld, supra note 88, at 294-95; Comment, Mandatory Pro Bone, supra
note 109, at 367-68.
117. Williamson v. Lee Optical, Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
118. This amendment provides in pertinent part: "[N]or shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." US. CONST. amend. V.
119. United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
978 (1966). The court specifically held there was no taking of the attorney's services,
grounding its decision on the notion that a lawyer is "an officer of the court obligated
to represent indigents for little or no compensation upon court order. Thus, the law-
yer has consented to, and assumed, this obligation and when he is called upon to
fulfill it, he cannot contend that it is a 'taking of his services.'" Id. at 635. Sparks v.
Parker, 368 So. 2d 528, 532 (Ala. 1979) ("A Fifth Amendment 'taking' of property
does not occur when the state simply requires an individual to fulfill a commitment
he has made."). Although the quoted language from these two cases is not limited to
the criminal context, it should be noted that both decisions involved criminal mat-
ters. This raises the question whether there is a distinction between obligations of
attorneys to accept cases where criminal charges have been brought against individu-
als who have a constitutional right to counsel and obligations of attorneya to re-
present individuals in private litigation. To the author's knowledge this distinction
has not been addressed in a court case.
120. Those rejecting it include Rosenfeld, supra note 88, at 287-90, Comment,
Mandatory Pro Bono, supra note 109, at 366-67. Shapiro, supra note 88, at 777 says
that such a challenge "might fail, but only by a whisker." Shapiro balances the fac-
tors courts have traditionally looked to in eminent domain cases (the extent to which
there has been a direct physical invasion of the person's property, the degree of harm
to the property, also known as the extent of interference with "investment-bached
MAINE LAW REVIEW
fifth amendment challenge. One centers around the notion that "the
enforcement of an obligation already owed to the public cannot con-
stitute a taking for public use within the fifth amendment's stric-
tures. '121 The other has to do with the fact that lawyers enjoy a
monopoly on the practice of law and that "the economic benefit of
this monopoly offsets the burden of accepting court appoint-
ments. 1 22 The courts appear to have grounded their decisions on
the first of these arguments.
1 23
As may be seen from the foregoing, cases in "which attorneys have
successfully argued that their rights will be violated if they are co-
erced into providing uncompensated representation are almost non-
existent. In the few instances where attorneys have succeeded in
their challenges to coerced representation, reasons other than those
based on constitutional amendments have been advanced by courts
to justify the result.1 2 4
E. Policy Considerations
Aside from any claimed constitutional violations, a number of pol-
icy arguments have been advanced against a mandatory pro bono
program. These include such objections as: 1) there is no guarantee
it will solve the problem; 2) the quality of representation may not be
very high if attorneys are coerced into representing the poor or are
forced to represent them in matters in which the attorney lacks ex-
expectations," and the extent to which the state's action is designed to extract public
good or to prevent harmful uses) against the arguments relating to the history and
tradition of the bar to serve without compensation and the monopoly on the practice
of law that attorneys enjoy. Id. at 773-76.
121. Rosenfeld, supra note 88, at 288 (footnote omitted). This rationale was used
by the United States Supreme Court in a case upholding the detaining of a material
witness at compensation of one dollar per day. Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S.
578 (1973).
122. Note, Court Appointment of Attorneys in Civil Cases: The Constitutionality
of Uncompensated Legal Assistance, 81 COL. L. REv. 366, 388 (1981). A monopoly by
itself does not distinguish lawyers from other groups subject to licensing, but it has
been suggested that "[n]o other profession has a similarly indispensable relationship
to a major branch of government responsible for the formulation and implementation
of public policy, and in none other is public service so much a part of the licensed
activity." Fisch, supra note 102, at 539. Others have suggested that if the profession
is unwilling to make its advocacy skills available to the indigent, the public will have
no choice but to permit encroachment by nonlawyers; that is, to break up the monop-
oly of the practice of law. Smith, A Mandatory Pro Bono Service Standard-Its
Time Has Come, 35 U. Mma L. Ray. 727, 734-35 (1981).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965); Sparks v.
Parker, 368 So. 2d 528, 532 (Ala. 1979).
124. See, e.g., State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. 1985) (Missouri
courts have no inherent authority to appoint unwilling counsel in civil cases without
compensation); State v. Rush, 46 N.J. 399, 217 A.2d 441 (1966) (burden of represent-
ing the indigent in criminal matters without compensation has become more than the
legal profession alone should bear).
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pertise; 3) providing the poor with more legal help will flood the
court system; 4) the economic burden of such representation will re-
ally fall on newly admitted attorneys and/or on small firms or sole
practitioners; and 5) there would be too many administrative and
enforcement problems with a mandatory pro bono program.1 2 5 None
of these policy arguments appears strong enough to tip the scale
against the establishment of such a program.
With respect to whether mandatory pro bono will actually solve
the problem of lack of legal representation for the poor, a perusal of
the Maine Commission's Report suggests that it would not. 120 Advo-
cates of a mandatory program, however, view it as one step among
several that collectively will address the problem. 27 Moreover, it is
more meaningful to ask whether mandatory pro bono is a significant
step that will improve the situation, not whether mandatory pro
bono alone will solve the problem of legal representation of the
poor.12
8
The answer to the argument that coerced representation will re-
sult in poorer quality representation lies in the fact that all repre-
sentation is governed by a code of professional responsibility to
which lawyers are expected to adhere and for which they may be
disciplined if they do not.129 It is therefore anticipated that attor-
neys would bring the same level of professionalism to their work for
the indigent as they would to any other client.
The suggestion that providing the poor with legal help will flood
an already overcrowded court system appears to work in direct op-
position to the notion of equal justice for all. Apart from the fact
that the poor have not caused the overcrowding because they have
had limited access to the system, how can it be "just" to manage
court dockets on the basis of whether someone can afford an attor-
ney? Moreover, many of the problems of the poor identified by the
Maine Commission relate to basic needs that may, with the help of
an advocate, lend themselves to resolution outside of a courtroom.
125. Comment, Mandatory Pro Bone, supra note 109, at 369-74.
126. The findings and recommendations of the Maine Commission are that there
must be a multi-pronged approach to solving the problem. Not only would it be nec-
essary for all active attorneys to do pro bono work, but also a large increase in the
number of lawyers and paralegals who work for legal services providers would be
needed if the poor in Maine are to have adequate legal representation. Coma's oN
REPORT, supra note 4, at 5-6.
127. MARYLAND ACTION PLAN, supra note 8, at x-xi; NEW YoRK PRELUNARY RE-
PORT, supra note 8, at 22. Among the other steps that have been recommended are:
increased state and federal spending, increased community education, a law school
loan forgiveness program for those who work for the indigent, increased use of parale-
gals, and a comprehensive IOLTA program. See CmLPAs.ION RPoR (Maine), MARY-
LAND ACTON PLAN, supra note 8, at 31-36 and NEw YoRx PREumARy REPoRT,
supra note 8, at 59-64 for more expansive lists.
128. Comment, Mandatory Pro Bone, supra note 109, at 372.
129. In Maine, the Code of Professional Responsibility is set forth in M. Bar R. 3.
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The other policy arguments (poorer quality representation where
an attorney must represent an individual in an area of the law in
which he or she lacks expertise, the economic burden of such repre-
sentation falling on newly admitted attorneys or on small firms, as
well as administrative and enforcement problems) are not insur-
mountable, but may be resolved through the careful design of a
mandatory pro bono program. For example, lack of expertise can be
addressed either through training programs for attorneys or by al-
lowing attorneys to satisfy their pro bono obligation through partici-
pation in a program such as the Volunteer Lawyers Project, where
an attorney's skills can be matched with a client's needs. One writer
has countered the economic burden argument by suggesting that a
"hard-luck" exception be incorporated in the mandatory program
and that new attorneys attempting to build a client base be relieved
of their pro bono obligation for a few years.130
The various policy objections do point out the need to thought-
fully consider and address a number of different questions in order
to structure and implement a fair pro bono program.' 3' Among the
matters to be addressed are these: 1) who would be required to do-
nate services; 2) how is the donated service to be measured; 3) what
type of service qualifies to meet the obligation; 4) how are cases to
be matched with attorneys both to ensure a fair allocation of the
burden of service and to ensure that attorneys are given cases that
match their expertise; 5) may attorneys fulfill their obligation
through group activities; 6) may an attorney "buy out" of his obliga-
tion by contributing money instead of services; 7) are there any rea-
sons that would justify excusing an attorney from performing the
required service; 8) how will the program be administered; and 9)
how will the body administering it determine a violation has oc-
curred and what will be the penalty for such a violation? Working
out the answers to these questions would require a collective effort.
The best approach may be to assign a group of attorneys within a
state the responsibility for fashioning a program, with a period of
time for comment by all members of the profession prior to adop-
tion by a state's highest court through amendment of the bar rules.
Only in this way will a workable system, adapted to the needs of
each state and perceived as fair by the members of the profession
practicing in that state, emerge.
130. Comment, Mandatory Pro Bono, supra note 109, at 373. The hard-luck ex-
ception would be one granted in a very limited number of circumstances for a partic-
ular year's service requirement. Id.
131. There is not necessarily a "best way" to proceed inasmuch as no state has yet
adopted such a program. As seen from the New York and Maryland legal needs stud-
ies, there is a divergence of opinion even on the issue of whether the service require-
ment should be measured in terms of the number of cases accepted (Maryland ap-
proach) or in terms of the number of hours donated (New York approach). See infra
note 134.
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F. Existing Rules and Calls for Change
At the present time there is no state that imposes a mandatory
pro bono requirement on all its attorneys. Until this happens, it is
unlikely that the constitutional issues will be definitively resolved or
the policy issues squarely addressed. The unsettled nature of the
matter has not silenced the call for mandatory pro bono in some
states and within the American Bar Association. Following the stud-
ies of legal needs within their states, the Maryland Advisory Coun-
cil 3 2 and New York Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal
Servicesis both recommended a mandatory pro bono requirement
through changes in bar rules.134 The mandatory pro bono require-
ment was by no means the only recommendation of either group,
but in spite of a variety of other proposals to help the indigent with
obtaining legal assistance, the mandatory pro bono program was
considered necessary.135 The Arizona Legal Services Committee'-0
132. The Advisory Council was established by the Maryland Legal Services Cor-
poration to study the needs of the poor. Chaired by Congressman Benjamin Cardin,
the Council included a cross section of lawyers, public officials, legislators, judge3, and
human services leaders. MARYLm AcTioN PLAN, supra note 8, at 2.
133. The New York Committee was appointed by the Chief Judge of the State of
New York. Its mission was similar to the Maryland Council and its membership in-
cluded private practitioners, legal services providers, academics, and public officials.
NEw YoRK PRmzmNARY REPoRT, supra note 8, at 1-2.
134. The Maryland Council recommended that the Maryland Court of Appeals:
Adopt a rule requiring all private attorneys to accept at least one civil case
annually on behalf of an indigent person without compensation upon refer.
ral from the Maryland Volunteer Lawyers Service, Legal Aid Bureau, Ma-
ryland Disability Law Center, or other nonprofit or bar association-spon-
sored program providing civil legal assistance to low-income persons under
guidelines established by the Maryland Legal Services Corporation Act; and
requiring all other licensed attorneys to perform some form of appropriate
law related services on behalf of low-income persons.
MAR _sw AcnoN PLAN, supra note 8, at 32. For an excellent series of articles on the
subject of expanding pro bono services in Maryland, written after the above recom-
mendation was made, see Symposium, 49 MD. L Rxv. 1-102 (1990).
The New York Committee proposed the following requirement:
Except as otherwise provided... every attorney who is required to file a
registration statement ... shall have the obligation to perform a minimum
of forty (40) hours of qualifying services during each two (2) year registra-
tion period. This obligation shall be performed personally, except as other-
wise permitted ....
NEw YoRK PRELumARY REPoRT, supra note 8, at 78. The Committee further recom-
mended that a group of attorneys be allowed to work together to fulfill the require-
ment provided records of the group's activities were kept. Members of a group, how-
ever, must have been admitted to practice in the state for more than two years. Id. at
79. Attorneys who practice in firms with fewer than 10 attomeya and who have been
admitted to practice for more than two years also were given the option of satisfying
all or part of their service requirement by paying $50 per hour of qualifying services
not performed. Id. at 79-80. The money could be paid to any of several approved
programs. Id. at 80.
135. The Maryland Council recommended, among other things, increased federal
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also focused much of its attention on mandatory pro bono but de-
clined to recommend a mandatory requirement. 13 7 The Arizona
Committee instead decided to promote a debate and dialogue con-
cerning mandatory, as distinguished from voluntary, pro bono
among members of the bar during 1990.88 It further specified that
the "debate take place against a backdrop that the State Bar will
assess, in one year's time, whether volunteerism is working."' 89 If
volunteerism did not work, then the Committee was prepared to rec-
ommend abandoning a voluntary rule for a mandatory one."10
Ten years ago the ABA Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standards (known as the Kutak Commission) included in its discus-
sion draft of the proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct a
rule that would have required attorneys to provide unpaid public
service and to make annual reports concerning such service.141 The
rule met with such resistance that the entire set of model rules was
threatened, and the Commission decided to eliminate its proposed
requirement. 42 At present, the ABA's Model Rule 6.1 contains non-
and state funding; a mandatory IOLTA program; surcharges on civil filing fees;
mandatory pro bono for law school students; a law school loan forgiveness program
for those entering public service careers; and expanded education and public informa-
tion programs. MARYLAND ACTION PLAN, supra note 8, at 31-36.
The New York Committee recommended, in addition to mandatory pro bono, a law
school loan forgiveness program; increased use of retired lawyers; increased use of
paralegals; increased community education; increased federal and state funding; and
the expansion of compensated appointed counsel in areas relating to housing, public
assistance, matrimonial and child support. NEw YORK PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra
note 8, at 59-64.
136. The Arizona Committee is a committee of the state bar association that was
formed in 1982. In 1988 the bar association's board of governors asked the committee
to study ways to improve and expand the delivery of legal services to the poor. Am-
ZONA MAJORITY REPORT, supra note 8, at 51, 55.
137. The Committee stated in its report that a majority of the committee favored
a mandatory requirement but felt the state bar was not ready for such a step. Id. at 5.
A separate Minority Report was written, and that report specifically recommended a
mandatory pro bono requirement. State Bar of Arizona, LEGAL SERVICES CorrMnb s
MINORITY REPORT at 34-35 (1989).
138. ARIZONA MAJORITY REPORT, supra note 8, at 5-6. The Committee felt a de-
bate would, among other things, focus attention on the needs of the poor and en-
courage greater voluntary efforts by the bar. Id. at 6.
139. Id. at 6. The report recommended that a survey of attorneys be conducted
during the year to determine how many hours are being devoted to pro bono work.
Id. at 6-11.
140. Id. at 6.
141. Smith, supra note 122, at 727-28.
142. Id. at 728. Opposition arose for both philosophical and political reasons and
because of several shortcomings of the rule as proposed. Id. For example, the rule did
not specify how many hours should be devoted to pro bono work, and the annual
reporting system appeared cumbersome and reflected an unwarranted lack of confi-
dence in lawyers. Id. Constitutional arguments based on the fifth and fourteenth
amendments were also voiced, though they do not appear to have been the center-
piece of the objections. See 1 G. HAZARD & W. HODEs, THE LAW OF LAWYERIN0: A
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enforceable language stating that "[a] lawyer should render public
interest legal service."1 3
Maine also has a rule regarding public interest legal service. It is
found in Maine Bar Rule 3.10, which reads in part- "A lawyer en-
gaged in active practice in the State of Maine should render unpaid
public interest legal service of a type and amount reasonable in all
the circumstances."'" It is an entirely voluntary rule without any
guidelines as to what constitutes a reasonable amount of service. It
does, however, spell out the types of service that qualify under the
rule.
45
Despite tha lack of any statewide program mandating pro bono
services or of a stronger ABA model rule, a few local bar associations
have incorporated mandatory pro bono requirements in their regula-
tions. 46 The Orange County Bar Association of Florida is an exam-
ple of such a program. Membership is voluntary but those who join
are required to accept two pro bono referrals each year or to pay
$250 in lieu of accepting such referrals.147 The Orange County pro-
gram has approximately 13,500 public contacts a year and repre-
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNnucT 491-92 (1989). No men-
tion of the constitutional arguments is made in the Smith article, supra note 122.
143. MODEL RuLE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1. Recently the ABA's House
of Delegates adopted a resolution to the effect that lawyers should devote at least 50
hours to pro bono work Marcotte, Pro Bono Policy Passed, 74 ABA J. 140 (Oct.
1988).
144. When proposed, the rule used the words "shall render unpaid public interest
legal service" rather than "should render unpaid public interest legal service." See
PROPOSED RuLE 3.10, Supp. Report of the Advisory Comm. on Code of Prof. Rep.
(Nov. 3, 1983) (on file with the author). It appears that opposition to a mandatory
rule was so strong that the Maine Supreme Judicial Court promulgated it using the
word "should."
145. This includes services provided to persons of limited means at no fee or at a
reduced fee; participation in a program such as VLP; services at no fee or a reduced
fee for charitable organizations that provide support for the indigent; and services
aimed at improving the law, the legal system or the legal profession. M. Bar R. 3.10.
The types of service found in the Maine rule are more narrowly drawn and more
demanding than those listed in its ABA counterpart. See Me. Rptr., 467-78 A.2d
xxviii LIM
146. See Comment, Mandatory Pro Bono, supra note 109, at 365.
147. Marin-Rosa & Stepter, Orange County-Mandatory Pro Bono in a Volun-
tary Bar Association, 59 FLA. B. J. 21 (Dec. 1985). The Orange County Bar Associa-
tion formed a nonprofit corporation, The Legal Aid Society of the Orange County Bar
Association, Inc., which serves both as a law firm and as the referral mechanism for
all lawyers in the bar association not opting to pay $250 in lieu of service. Id. The Bar
Association made a decision not to try to obtain federal funding for its Legal Aid
Society because of the loss of local control over the program and the uncertainty of
future federal funding. Id. The Society's budget approximately $450,000 in 1984, is
derived from surcharges on Orange County court filing fees, the amounts paid by
members in lieu of service contributions, and grants. Id. at 21-22. There are approxi-
mately 1,500 members of the bar association. Id. at 22.
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sents about 1,500 persons in litigation.148 This shows what can be
accomplished by a well-organized group with a high participation
rate.
Another type of mandatory program that has begun to take root
involves law schools. In 1987, Tulane Law School became the first
law school in the country to require students to perform a specified
number of hours of legal service on behalf of indigents in order to
graduate.149 The University of Pennsylvania Law School followed
suit in 1989 by adding a graduation requirement of free public ser-
vice work for its students.150 The schools see benefits for both the
students and those receiving legal services. The students learn prac-
tical skills, have the opportunity to develop a "mentor relationship"
with a practicing attorney,151 and, it is hoped, are instilled with a
sense of public service that will carry over into their careers. 12
IV. SHOULD MAiNE ADOPT A MANDATORY PRO BONO RULE?
The study completed by the Maine Commission on Legal Needs
has documented the need for a greatly increased level of legal ser-
vices for Maine's poor. 53 Given existing resources, the major legal
services providers and the referral system of the Volunteer Lawyers
Project cannot meet that need. It seems clear that a much higher
level of attorney participation is necessary if the goal of providing
access to justice for all of Maine's citizens is to be achieved. The
obvious way to increase attorney participation is to mandate it. Not
only would the goal come closer to realization, but also the higher
level of attorney participation in work that assists the poor would
contribute to an improved public image for the profession.
One way of mandating pro bono work would be to bring a case
before the Maine Supreme Judicial Court that raises the issue of the
judiciary's inherent authority to appoint counsel for indigents in
civil matters. Assuming, however, that the Maine court decides that
such authority exists, this would, at best, approach the problem in a
piecemeal fashion. It would not result in profession-wide pro bono
work, but would simply give the trial court discretion to appoint
counsel for indigent litigants.
Involving the entire profession in pro bono work would be accom-
148. Id. at 22.
149. 1988-1989 Tulane Law School Catalog. The requirement is 20 hours of ser-
vice. Students are assigned to an attorney who has been allocated a case by the New
Orleans Pro Bono Project. Id.
150. Penn Law School Move on Pro Bono Work Courts Public Service in Young
Lawyers, Wall St. J., May 22, 1989. The Penn Law School requirement involves 35
hours in each of the second and third years of school. Id.
151. Id. Students may also benefit by obtaining a job reference or possibly even a
future employer. Id.
152. 1988-1989 Tulane Law School Catalog.
153. See supra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
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plished most easily by having the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
amend the Maine Bar Rules to mandate it. Such an amendment
would amount to an exercise of the court's inherent authority to reg-
ulate the practice of law. Any changes in the rules, however, should
come only after a careful and thorough consideration of the policy
issues and other matters raised in part I1(E) of this Comment, in
order to ensure that a fair and workable pro bono system is the re-
sult. Is Maine ready for such a step?
Adopting a bar rule in Maine that would mandate pro bono efforts
may be premature at this juncture. This is so not because of the
various constitutional objections that have been raised or because of
the complexities in fashioning a program, and certainly not because
there is little need for lawyers to participate. Rather, it is because
Maine already has built a good base founded on volunteerism.'"
Maine attorneys should be given an opportunity to build on this
base with state and local bar associations taking the lead."s
The various bar associations should actively encourage greater
participation in the Volunteer Lawyers Project""0 by providing in-
centives and benefits to attorneys who take cases referred by
VLP.17 They should go a step further by giving serious considera-
tion to making participation in VLP a requirement of membership.
They should assume a key role. in helping to make Maine's poor
154. Maine not only has the highest participation rate (over 70%) in its IOLTA
program among voluntary state programs, but also the attorney participation rate in
VLP (about 60%) is far higher than the national average of 15%. Schendel, Message
from the President, MAnNE BAR FouND. 1989 ANNuAL RE ORT.
155. While the problem of access to justice for all is really a problem for all Maine
citizens to help resolve, it is not the purpose of this Comment to focus on what public
officials or the average citizen should do. It does seem appropriate, however, for attor-
neys to take the lead in solving the problem inasmuch as attorneys, by virtue of their
licensing monopoly, are the only ones in a position to provide the needed services.
156. It is clear that VLP is underutilized in its present form. In other words, VLP
could handle more cases than it does with the lawyers already participating in the
program. VLP has a panel of approximately 1,500 lawyers willing to accept up to
three cases per year. Statistics show that 898 cases were referred for pro bono repre-
sentation (either with or without litigation) in 1988, well under the three cases per
attorney limit. COsLR SON REPORT, supra note 4, at 59. It is quite likely the underu-
tilization results from the fact that many were not able to reach VLP by telephone
due to an insufficient number of phone lines and from the fact that many of Maine's
poor are unaware of the free legal assistance available to them. These facts were doc-
umented by the Maine Commission on Legal Needs. See supra notes 19 and 25 and
accompanying text. State and local bar associations can help solve the underutiliza-
tion problem by taking the initiative to inform the public of this resource.
157. One possible benefit is to provide free legal training and education for attor-
neys willing to take indigent cases outside their areas of expertise. Such training
could prove useful in their regular law practices. Another incentive involves publicly
recognizing attorneys who are making significant contributions in the public interest
area, not only through bar association publicity but also through media coverage. A
third possibility is to establish a fund so that attorneys representing the indigent can
be reimbursed for their out-of-pocket expenses.
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population aware of the free services available, and they should co-
operate in the effort to provide Maine's rural poor with access to
more attorneys.158 Moreover, the State Bar Association should rec-
ommend changes in the Maine Bar Rule governing public interest
legal service so that the importance of such service is given greater
emphasis, and guidelines are established for what constitutes a rea-
sonable amount of such service.'69 Most important of all, the State
Bar Association and its members should take an active role in seeing
that the recommendations of the Maine Legal Needs Commission
are implemented. These recommendations include: establishing a
comprehensive IOLTA program, seeking greater federal and state
appropriations for legal services organizations, soliciting private con-
tributions for legal assistance for the poor, and developing sliding
fee scales to make legal services available to the near poor.160 In ad-
dition, the University of Maine School of Law should adopt a
mandatory pro bono requirement for its students, many of whom
will become members of Maine's bar associations. 61 Newly admitted
attorneys will then already have experience assisting the poor and
will be prepared to carry on with such work in their careers.
Maine's attorneys should be given an opportunity to voluntarily
respond to the indigent's need for legal services. If the response is
not forthcoming, however, serious consideration must then be given
to adopting a mandatory pro bono requirement.
Wendy F. Rau
158. A 1988 survey of the practice of law in Maine revealed that nearly 75% of all
lawyers practicing in Maine are working in either the greater Portland area, one of
the larger cities (defined as Lewiston/Auburn, Bangor/Brewer and Biddeford/Saco),
or one of the smaller cities (Augusta, Waterville, Brunswick, Sanford, Presque Isle,
Caribou). THE 1988 SURVEY OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN MAINEFINAL REPORT (Nov.
1988) at 5 and Figure 8. Also noteworthy is the fact that only 2.2% of Maine's attor-
neys work in legal aid. Id. Figure 12.
159. A reasonable amount of service can be defined either in terms of the number
of hours devoted to public service work or in terms of accepting a specified number of
cases per year.
160. COMMSSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 12, 16.
161. Such a program would benefit the students and the poor alike and hopefully
instill newly admitted lawyers with a continuing appreciation of the need to assist the
indigent. A suggested approach for the University of Maine School of Law is to re-
quire students to complete 20 hours in each of the second and third years of school. A
coordinator at the law school could work with VLP and the various legal services
providers to assign students to assist an attorney working on a pro bono case. Enough
flexibility should be built into the program to enable students to put forward their
own proposals for satisfying the requirement with approval of the school.
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